Governor, has been appointed to the sinecure of Chief Justice of the United States." '14 Although the nomination of Jay was approved by the Senate without delay, considerable doubt existed in the inner circles of the Adams administration that Jay would choose to forego his plans for retirement in favor of returning to the Court. On the day the nomination was presented to the Senate, Secretary of State John Marshall wrote that Jay would probably decline the office.'5 Only four days after writing Jay of his nomination, the President himself indicated to his son, Thomas, the possibility of a refusal.'6 In a Christmas Day letter to Thomas, Abigail Adams also expressed in confidence the fear that Jay would refuse the appointment.17 Should the awaited reply from Jay bring a refusal early in the new year, Adams would again be faced with the problem of selecting a suitable Federalist for the position, a decision made more pressing and more complicated as each remaining week of his presidency slipped away.
Since the President had failed to insure acceptance before making the nomination, time would have been lost, when there was no time to lose, if Jay decided to decline the post. During the interval in which President Adams awaited a reply from Jay'8 it is clear that consideration was given to the problems which would arise in such an eventuality. Either from cautious foresight or, despite his hopes, from a conviction that Jay would refuse his commission, Adams without waiting for the reply from Albany to reach Washington began to work out a possible alternative to be followed if it became necessary.
14 Aurora (Philadelphia, Pa.), Jan. 8, i8oi. The Aurora also circulated the Republican charge that Jay had been recommended in connection with a Federalist plan to prevent the election and place the Chief Justice in the presidency instead. Later, James Callender, writing in the Examiner (Richmond, Va.), Feb. 6, i8oi, was to assert that Adams had nominated Jay with "the previous certainty" that Jay would refuse, thus facilitating the introduction of John Marshall to the office. 15 To Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Dec. i8, i8oo, Pinckney Family Papers, Box i, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. 16 Dec. 23, i8oo, Letters Received, Adams Papers. 17 Dec. 25, i8oo, ibid. 18 The letter from Adams to Jay is dated Dec. i9, i8oo, Adams, Works of Adams, IX, 91-92. Jay's reply refusing the appointment was dated Jan. 2 It may possibly be that Adams felt that through the selection of Jay, who had the prestige of having been Washington's own choice as the first chief justice, he had avoided any party antagonism over the appointment. In addition, he had avoided wounding the sensibilities of any of the associate justices who might have looked less favorably upon the elevation of some other outsider to the highest rank.'9 In the event that Jay did not choose to return to the judiciary, the same choices for action would await the presidential decision, but as easy a solution was by no means evident. It seems quite clear that Adams fully intended at this time to select one of the associate justices to be chief justice should Jay refuse the nomination. As early as December 23, in fact, he was actively attempting to fill the subsequent vacancy in the Court which such a move would create.
While the outcome of the election had hung in the balance, officeholders under Federalist appointments had considered their future; some concluded that under a change of administration, they would not wish to continue service even if the Republicans permitted them to retain their offices. Among these was Jared Ingersoll, the noted leader of the Philadelphia bar and the United States district attorney for Pennsylvania. However, to prolong such an uncertainty until February was simply to complicate the situation further. If Ingersoll decided to accept the nomination, well and good. If he did not, then it would be necessary to select another figure, assure his willingness to accept, and have the nomination approved by Congress. If the judiciary bill should have passed by that time, as the President hoped it would, then ironically he might be spared by law the problem of appointing another associate justice. This would in turn create the probability that the next appointment would be that of a Republican justice. Amid such tangled eventualities, John Adams continued to wait for the answer from Jay to arrive. Jay's reply, written from Albany on January 2, was finally received by the President.40 As is well known, it brought a refusal to return as chief justice. The reasons Jay presented to the President are illuminating. Commenting upon the original federal court system which had seemed so defective to him when he had resigned the office in I795, he wrote:
Such was the temper of the times, that the Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States was in some respects more accommodated to 40 The date when Adams actually received Jay's reply is difficult to determine. Contrary to his usual custom, Adams marked no date of receipt on the original. Newspapers reported the fact on various dates, but it is impossible to separate the publication here of rumor and/or wishful thinking from known or announced fact. The Palladium (Boston, Mass.), Jan. 29, i8oi, printed a report dated Phila., Jan. 9, stating that "We hear that Mr. Jay has declined the acceptance of the office of Chief Justice." The Philadelphia Gazette and Daily Adveriser (Pa.), Jan. i6, i8oi, printed the information from Washington over the date of Jan. I2. The Gazette of the United States (Philadelphia, Pa.), Jan. I3, i8oi, reported that Jay had declined, but on Jan. I7, i8oi, stated "The President has received (italics mine) Jay's declension." The Aurora, Jan. I3, i8oi, included a notice that Jay had refused. The National Intelligencer (Washington), Jan. I4, I80i, stated that "The President has received (italics mine) Jay's declension." The Washington Museum, Jan. i6, i8oi, reported the fact also under the date Jan. I4. On Jan. i9, i8oi, Poulson's American Daily Advertiser (Philadelphia, Pa.), announced the news, and in other papers more distant the report naturally appeared at later dates. Although the National Intelligencer was an opposition paper, the wording of its report, together with its location at the seat of the government, together with the identical information in the Washington Museum also on the identical date, is reason enough to presume, I think, that this date (Jan. 14) is approximately correct. Marshall's reminiscences 27 years later of the sequence of events give the impression that Jay's refusal was received on Jan. i9, the day before his own appointment was made, but memory of detail of this sort may well not be precise; Adams, Autobiographical Sketch by Marshall, p. 30. of the President, and they were acutely aware that an immediate decision on this point was essential. If the President was thinking in terms of adding a new member to the Court, thus preserving the membership at six, any delay was a risk to be avoided. Benjamin Stoddert, the Secretary of the Navy, was at this point enlisted by some members of Congress to call upon the President and mention to him that the judiciary bill would be brought to a vote in the House on January 20, i8oi. Prevented by bad weather from paying a personal visit with the news, Stoddert dispatched a note to this effect on January ig and somewhat gingerly added a reminder of the importance of an immediate presidential decision regarding the Supreme Court before the House should act the next day: "As the bill proposes a reduction of the Judges to five-and as there are already five Judges in comission, it is suggested that there might be more difficulty in appointing a chief Justice without taking him from the present Judges, after the passage of this bill even by one Branch of the Legislature, than before."44
The sequence of this combination of circumstances makes clear that the action of the House of Representatives on the judiciary bill had direct bearing on the appointment which the President did make to the vacant seat on the bench. It also clarifies the reason why John Adams failed to follow his plan of selecting the chief justice from the membership of the Court. Indeed, it seems likely that it was the timing of the House action alone which forced him at this point to select a figure from outside the Court as the new chief justice. When Jay's refusal was received, the judiciary bill was still before the House in debate. Under the circumstances, even if Jared Ingersoll could be reached in Philadelphia, he could not be pressed for his final answer, since he had made clear that this was contingent upon the passage of the bill. This made it unwise to risk sending his nomination as associate justice to the Senate (together with that of Cushing as chief justice) only to have Ingersoll later decline.45 On January i9, the President received Stoddert's reminder from the members of Congress who urged an immediate decision before the vote on the judiciary bill should be taken the next day. A change of plans had to be made and made at once. When the hopelessness of their persuasion could not be ignored, the Senators had reason to take second thought at their delay in approving Marshall's nomination. The judiciary bill had been received in the Senate, after its passage by the House on January 21, the day after Marshall's nomination, and had been sent to committee. Federalist leaders may very likely have seen the advantages of approving the nomination before bringing the bill to the floor for debate for the same reasons that leaders in the House had desired that the appointment be made before that body voted on the bill. If the mind of the President could not be altered in favor of Paterson, was it not better to approve the nomination at hand rather than continue such a stalemate with the inflexible Adams? With little more than a month left to the administration, there seemed no point to be gained by continuing to oppose the appointment. The conclusion agreed upon, the Senate, on January 27, i8oi, gave unanimous approval to the nomination of Marshall to be chief justice. On January 29 the judiciary bill was reported out of committee to the floor of the Senate for the consideration of the upper house. The Supreme Court was composed of six Federalist members; contingent upon the passage of the bill, the proposed reduction to five members after the next vacancy would definitely apply to the incoming Republican president, and no Republican could be appointed to that bench until the death or retirement of two members. 65 Court on a writ of error at the August term, I796, from which it was continued several terms until Feb. i799. The Court then ordered the claimants to present their case within two days if they did not wish the case dismissed. As they still failed to do so, the Court dismissed the case for a failure to prosecute. In May i8oo, five years having passed, the decision of the Federal court before Judge Paterson in 1795 became final and conclusive; Gazette of the United States, Mar. 5, i8oi; Warren, Supreme Court, I, 69n. 65 The bill was passed by the House on Jan. 20 There was some speculation that although his nomination had been approved, Marshall would not take his seat on the bench until after the
